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MAKING THE MOST OF COMMODITIES PROGRAMME 
 
Like many other developing economy regions, Africa is benefitting from a sustained boom in 
commodities prices. Received wisdom has been that commodities production is an inherently 
enclave activity and that it undermines the viability of industry. The Making the Most of 
Commodities Programme challenges this negative view of the commodities sector. It‟s 
research analyses the determinants of backward and forward linkages, identifying policy 
responses which will broaden and deepen them. In so doing it contributes both to achieving 
sustainable growth and the spreading of benefits to a wider population. By incorporating 
younger researchers, building a research network, and dialogue with policymakers, the 
MMCP also seeks to build analytical and policy capacity, and to influence policy outcomes. 
 
The MMCP focuses on a diverse range of commodity sectors in a number of African 
economies, as well as on key infrastructural determinants of effective linkage development. A 
number of common factors are identified which will increase linkages beneficially and which 
lend themselves to policy intervention - the role of ownership, the nature and quality of 
infrastructure, the national system of innovation, spillover of skills to and from the 
commodities sector, linkages in regional economies and the nature and consistency of 
policies directed towards the commodities sectors.  
 
The MMCP country/commodity Discussion Papers are:  
1. „Linkages in Ghana‟s Gold Mining Industry: Challenging the Enclave Thesis‟, Gold Robin Bloch 
and George Owusu, 
2. „Chinese Construction Companies in Angola: A Local Linkages Perspective‟, Lucy Corkin 
3. „Development and Knowledge Intensification in Industries Upstream of Zambia‟s Copper Mining 
Sector‟, Judith Fessehaie 
4. „The drive to increase local procurement in the Mining Sector in Africa:  Myth or reality?‟, Chris 
Hanlin 
5. South African Mining Equipment and Related Services: Growth Constraints and Policy, David 
Kaplan 
6. Linkages in Botswana‟s Diamond Cutting and Polishing Industry‟, Letsema Mbayi 
7. The Nature and Determinants of Linkages in Emerging Minerals Commodity Sectors: A Case 
Study of Gold Mining in Tanzania, Vuyo Mjimba 
8. Enhancing Linkages of Oil and Gas Industry in the Nigerian Economy, Ademola Oyejide and 
Adeolu Adewuyi 
9. „The contribution to local enterprise development of infrastructure for commodity extraction 
projects: Tanzania‟s central corridor and Mozambique‟s Zambezi Valley‟, Dave Perkins and Glen 
Robbins 
10. „The Tropical Timber Industry in Gabon: A Forward Linkages Approach‟, Anne Terheggen 
11. „Backward Linkages in the Manufacturing Sector in the Oil and Gas Value Chain in Angola‟, 
Zeferino Teka 
12. „“One Thing Leads to Another” – Commodities, Linkages and Industrial Development: A 
Conceptual Overview‟, (Revised) Mike Morris, Raphael Kaplinsky, and David Kaplan  
13. „Commodities and Linkages: Industrialization in Sub Saharan Africa‟, Mike Morris, Raphael 
Kaplinsky, and David Kaplan  
14. „Commodities and Linkages: Meeting the Policy Challenge‟, Mike Morris, Raphael Kaplinsky, and 
David Kaplan  
 
The MMCP is a collaborative research and policy programme between Policy Research in 
International Services and Manufacturing (PRISM), Economics and CSSR, University of 
Cape Town and, Open University. The International Development Research Centre of 
Canada is the principal funder, with additional funding from the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, Harry Oppenheimer Institute, and Open University. Further information and 
other Discussion Papers can be downloaded from:  
 
http://commodities.open.ac.uk/discussionpapers or www.cssr.uct.ac.za/prism/publications  
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Abstract 
 
Sub-Sahara African commodity exporting economies have benefitted greatly from the 
commodities boom of the past decade. The conventional wisdom argues that 
resource extraction is corrosive of industrial development. This is due to a 
combination of the macroeconomic consequences of resource exploitation and the 
assumed enclave nature of capital- and technology-intensive mineral and energy 
extraction. The paper challenges this pessimistic „resource curse‟ argument and 
argues that there are unexploited opportunities for promoting industrial development 
through the development of linkages from the commodities sector. In particular, these 
opportunities may be greater for backward than for forward linkages, particularly in 
the minerals and energy sectors. In making this case, this Discussion Paper draws 
on the experience of high-income countries which have resource-intensive economic 
structures, the geographical specificity of many resources and the growing interest of 
large resource-extracting firms in outsourcing the production of inputs which are 
outside of their core competences, It sets out a general model of linkages between 
industry and services and the commodities sector which distinguishes between win-
win and win-lose outcomes. The paper concludes with a brief review of the reasons 
why Governments might wish to intervene to support linkages between the 
commodities and the industrial and service sectors. Companion Discussion Papers 
13 and 14 report the results of a detailed empirical research focus on the extent and 
determination of linkages in nine African economies, and on policies which may 
promote the broadening and deepening of linkages from the commodities to the 
industrial sector in Sub-Sahara Africa and other low income regions of the world.  
 
 
„”One Thing Leads to Another” – Commodities, Linkages and Industrial Development: A 
Conceptual Overview‟, Mike Morris, Raphael Kaplinsky and David Kaplan, MMCP Discussion 
Paper No 12, University of Cape Town and Open University, Revised October 2011. 
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FOREWORD 
Making the Most Commodities Programme (MMCP)/Africa results from a unique, cross-
cutting collaboration by the University of Cape Town and the Open University with the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The MMCP builds and consolidates on 
other IDRC supported research on Asian Drivers and their relations with Africa by expanding 
the research program to focus on the growth and boom in global commodity demand. The 
resulting data and analysis provided opportunities for vibrant and high quality capacity 
building processes which was an integral part of the core research process, as is evidenced 
in the various Discussion Papers.  
 
These discussion papers offer new information that will help Sub Saharan African (SSA) 
countries to maximize the potential linkage opportunities emanating from the production of 
commodities so as to promote sustainable industrial growth, and ensure widespread access 
to the fruits of this growth. The analysis will help decision-makers integrate and target efforts 
to increase the returns from extractive natural resources and promote mutual benefits 
between partner countries. The findings are aimed at academics, policy makers and high 
level technical officers working on African industrialisation, including those focusing on Asia-
Africa trade relations. The findings have also enhanced our understanding of the dynamics 
that SSA countries experience in management of their natural resources and the significant 
threats these pose to their governance, macroeconomic management, and industrial 
development. The MMCP also makes recommendations for developing countries to 
incorporate into local and regional decision-making and how governments can respond to 
development challenges associated with natural resources. This publication therefore 
encapsulates an area of critical importance to resource rich, but often poor, countries in SSA.  
 
The MMCP‟s approach, based on innovative ideas and integrated research, created 
exceptionally strong links with industry and public stakeholders, hence the potential for 
widespread application in other developing countries.  These final synthesis discussion 
papers ensure that decision-makers in Africa have the appropriate tools and information to 
minimize the potential costs of the boom in commodities prices and to maximize the 
opportunities to build industrial linkages to lead commodity producers. In achieving these 
objectives, the team applied a distinctive and innovative policy dissemination process. This 
involved taking the research results and policy proposals to forums where policy makers 
were present, not just in Africa, but in the UN system and the International Financial 
Institutions in Europe and North America. In doing this they contribute to a policy agenda 
which will ensure that new opportunities for SSA commodities will not bypass decision-
makers, and countries will not have to lose significant amounts of wealth as new natural 
resources are exploited.  The MMCP process has also played a major role in capacity 
development in SSA – in total seven of the young researchers in this project will have 
obtained their PhDs as a direct consequence of their participation in this programme. 
Moreover, links have been established with research institutions across the continent which 
will no doubt endure in future research collaborations. 
 
I am confident that the information contained in this document will assist SSA countries to 
develop strategic responses to the boom in commodity prices and improve the management 
of their natural resources. I therefore hope that decision-makers will see the value of the 
analysis and apply the findings to inform future decisions. On behalf of the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), I wish to extend our sincere thanks to the lead 
researchers involved in this effort, the University of Cape Town and the Open University, as 
well as all participating institutions and stakeholders that contributed to the development of 
these Discussion Papers. 
 
Paul Okiira Okwi, Senior Programme Officer, International Development Research Centre 
  5 
CONTENTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION           6 
 
2. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM:         9 
     COMMODITIES VERSUS INDUSTRIALISATION 
 
The Enclave Nature of Commodity Production     9 
 
Declining Commodities-Manufactures Terms of Trade   10 
and the Price Volatility of Commodities 
 
The demonstration effect of industrialisation,    12  
and normal patterns of growth 
 
3. HAS ANYTHING CHANGED?        14 
 
The Re-emergence of China as a Leading Economy   15 
 
The Fracturing of Global Value Chains     22 
and the Growth of Outsourcing 
 
4. AN OVERVIEW ON LINKAGE DEVELOPMENT:     24 
    HIRSCHMAN’S THEORY OF LINKAGES 
 
5. A NEW ERA: CAN COMMODITIES REINFORCE INDUSTRIALISATION? 27 
 
Backward or Forward? The Path of Least Resistance   27 
 
What factors determine the breadth      32  
and depth of linkages from the commodities sectors? 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS: WHY SHOULD GOVERNMENTS INTERVENE  
    IN LINKAGE DEVELOPMENT?        35 
 
REFERENCES          39 
 
  6 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The strengthening of the industrial sector lies at the heart of the development 
agenda. The success of China and other emerging economies in expanding their 
manufacturing sectors and enhancing their economic growth rates over the past two 
decades is suggestive of the fruits to be obtained from this development path. 
However, the challenge facing many developing economies in promoting 
industrialisation in the modern era is a complex one. On the one hand, the 
foundations of the success of China and other newly emerging economies were built 
on decades of import substituting industrialisation. This route to promoting industry is 
now heavily restricted by the trade-policy liberalisation which has accompanied 
deepening globalisation. On the other hand the export-intensive route which has 
underwritten the success of the first- and second-tier Asian economies is 
circumscribed for new entrants precisely because of the success of China and other 
successful exporting economies. Global markets for manufactures are now intensely 
competitive, making it not just very difficult for new entrants in external markets, but 
also in competing with imports in their domestic markets. 
 
In recent years, commodity exporting economies have benefitted greatly from a 
sustained increase in the price of their exports and (as we shall see below) there are 
reasons to believe that commodity prices will remain robust in the medium-term, and 
perhaps in the long-term too. There are great dangers to relying on these resource 
rents however, since the capital intensive nature of many commodities sectors limits 
employment and the distribution of these rents. Moreover, despite the confidence 
which these economies may justifiably have in sustained high prices for commodities, 
prudence dictates that a diversified economy is more robust and less vulnerable to 
the shocks which confront monoculture economies, particularly in the commodities 
sectors which have experienced, and will almost certainly continue to experience 
severe price volatility. One route to industrial development in these commodity 
exporting economies arises from the possibilities of building linkages into and out of 
commodity production. It is this agenda which the Making the Most of Commodities 
Programme addresses. In this paper we will set out the conceptual reasons which 
lead us to believe that the strengthening of linkages to the commodities sector are an 
important avenue for industrial development. Detailed verification of these conceptual 
issues will be provided in a forthcoming synthesis paper, and in the individual project 
Discussion Papers which have resulted from the research programme.1  
 
However, it is widely believed that the exploitation of commodities and industrial 
development do not go hand-in-hand, particularly in low income countries and 
economies which are heavily dependent on the export of natural resources. In its 
extreme view, the prevailing belief is not just that there are few synergies between 
the commodities and industrial sectors, but that the exploitation of commodities 
undermines industrial development. As we shall see, there are reasons to question 
the “hard version” of this conventional wisdom, partly because it misreads history, 
and partly because of profound changes which are now occurring in the global 
economy. These changes provide both threat and opportunity to commodity-
                                            
1
 http://commodities.open.ac.uk/discussionpapers; www.cssr.uct.ac.za/prism/publications 
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exporting countries. The challenge for policy is to ensure that the outcome is one 
which is promoting of both growth and more equitable development outcomes. 
 
After briefly identifying the full range of commodities under review, we begin in 
Section 2 with a review of the Resource Curse thesis which argues that the 
exploitation of commodities undermines the development of industry. Together with 
the declining terms of trade of commodities and the positive correlation between 
industry and per capita incomes, this has contributed to a perspective in which 
commodities have been seen as an undesirable form of economic specialisation.  
However, it is our contention that this trade-off between commodities and industry is 
no longer justified (Section 3).  The shift in global economic gravity from high income 
northern to low income southern economies suggests a reversal in the long-term 
declining trend in the commodities-manufactures terms of trade. Moreover, there has 
been a major shift over the past decade in the structure of global value chains in 
many sectors whereby lead firms actively seek to outsource non-core competences, 
and thus to promote linkages. This suggests that we may be entering a new era in 
the relationship between the exploitation of commodities and the growth of industry. 
In Section 4 we provide an architecture for assessing these synergistic opportunities 
based on pioneering analysis by Albert Hirschman in the 1960s. This is followed in 
Section 5 by a discussion of the factors which may determine the capacity for 
efficient linkage development in this new era, and we conclude (in Section 6) with a 
brief review of the reasons why governments may wish to intervene to speed up this 
process of linkage development. In subsequent Discussion Papers we report the 
results of our empirical investigation of the nature and determinants of linkage 
development in a range of SSA economies (Morris et al 2011a), and of the policies 
which may lead to a win-win outcome between lead commodity producing firms and 
the growth of domestic linkages in low income SSA economies (Morris et al 2011b). 
 
Before we proceed on this journey, it is important to define what we mean by 
linkages. In discussing linkage development we distinguish between the breadth of 
linkages (the range of inputs purchased or outputs processed domestically) and the 
depth of linkages (the extent of local value added in these linkages). Further, unlike 
many SSA governments (see Morris et al 2011a) we do not conflate the development 
of domestic linkages with the development of national ownership of firms linking to 
the commodities sector. Ownership is seen as a factor which might or might not 
influence the breadth and depth of linkages in complex ways. But in our view it is not 
a first-order specific objective in linkage development. A third clarification is that 
domestic value added in commodities value chains is not synonymous with the 
extension of linkages. In some cases, value added may be increased within the core 
commodity exploiting firm. Although this may be an important contribution to 
economic growth, in this programme we only consider the linkage part of the 
domestic value added story, that is, those cases where increasing value added 
occurs outside of the lead commodity exploiting firm.  
 
Finally, an issue which is addressed at various stages in the Discussion Paper, is the 
time horizon of achieving competitive production in the development of linkages. 
Although we identify some cases where there is scope for linkage development at 
little cost to commodities production, in most cases there will be costs in broadening 
and deepening linkages. At the same time, domestic capabilities will often grow over 
time as it will amongst global suppliers. A priori we are unable to make a general 
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statement of the conditions and linkages where it makes sense to accept short-term 
costs in the expectation that they will be eroded as domestic capabilities grow. This is 
a contextual judgement based on the sector, the linkage, domestic capabilities and 
social time-preference. However, the general principle that “efficiency” in linkage 
development should be seen as a dynamic process suffuses the analysis in this 
paper and in the complementary Discussion Papers. 
 
Because the natural resource sector includes a diverse range of commodities, before 
undertaking this analysis, it is helpful to briefly describe the three major families of 
commodities (Figure 1). Although there are intra-family differences, the major 
differences arise between these three different categories of natural resources. As a 
consequence both of their different production characteristics and primary users, they 
are associated with different degrees and types of linkages to other sectors. The 
primary sub-sectors of soft commodities are cereals (such as wheat and rice), 
beverages (such as tea and coffee), crops (such as cotton and timber), livestock 
(such as beef and pork) and fisheries. Hard commodities comprise precious metals 
(such as gold), ferrous metals (such as iron-ore), non-ferrous metals (such as 
copper), and rare earths and minerals (such as coltan). Energy commodities are 
predominantly oil, gas and coal. Each of these commodities feeds into a series of 
manufacturing sectors. With the exception of some of industrial crops such as cotton 
and timber, the agricultural commodities are predominantly used in the food sectors. 
Excluding precious minerals, the minerals group of commodities are generally 
incorporated as inputs into the industrial and construction sectors. Energy 
commodities are used across the spectrum, both as an intermediate and as final 
consumption input.  
 
Figure 1: Three Primary Commodity Families and their Sector of Use 
Primary Sector Category Major Use Examples 
Soft 
Commodities 
Industrial Crops Input in manufactures 
Timber 
Cotton 
Fisheries 
Final  Consumption 
(with limited 
processing) 
Prawns, cod 
Cereals 
Rice 
Wheat 
Beverages Tea, Coffee, Cocoa 
Livestock Cattle, Dairy products 
Hard 
Commodities 
Precious Metals Input in manufactures Gold, Silver, Platinum 
Ferrous Metals 
Infrastructure and 
Construction 
 
Input in manufactures 
Iron Ore and Steel 
Non-Ferrous Metals 
Copper, Zinc, Lead, 
Aluminium 
Rare earths and 
metals 
Input in manufactures 
Cerium Plutonium 
Cobalt 
Energy 
Petroleum products 
Coal 
Nuclear 
Renewables 
Fuel for industrial 
usage  
Final  consumption 
Oil, Natural Gas and 
Coal. 
 
Nuclear power 
Renewable power 
Source: Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011 
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2. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: COMMODITIES VERSUS 
INDUSTRIALISATION 
 
In a cross-country regression analysis of the growth performance in 97 countries for 
the period 1970-1990, Sachs and Warner (1997) concluded that resource 
abundance, measured as the ratio of primary commodities exports to GDP, was 
negatively correlated with GDP growth. They estimated that a doubling of the share 
of primary products in total exports between 1970 and 1990 led to a reduction in the 
annual GDP growth rate of between 0,62 to 1.51 percent. Their results were 
statistically significant after controlling for a variety of explanatory variables affecting 
growth rates. These are geography and climate, the presence of oil in exports, 
integration into the global economy, capital accumulation, institutional quality, 
commodity price shocks and resource abundance (the ratio of mineral production to 
GDP, the share of primary exports in total exports and per capita land area).  
 
In subsequent analysis, Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001) argued that the Dutch 
Disease was the major driver of this growth-reducing resource curse. First, they 
found services output to be higher than manufacturing output in resource-rich 
countries. This, they believed, confirmed their hypothesis that the natural resource 
sector diverted capital and labour into the non-tradables sectors. Second, resource 
abundance was associated with a reduction in the growth of the manufacturing and 
services sectors and in the merchandise export sector. Third, almost all countries 
responded to the Dutch disease with protectionist policies to promote 
industrialisation. This protective environment fostered inefficient firms and 
compounded the problems confronting the manufacturing sector.  
 
Beyond these factors identified by Sachs and Warner as affecting the relationship 
between commodities, growth and industrialisation lie a number of analytical 
explanations which were long prefigured in the development literature. These are the 
enclave nature of commodities production, the declining terms of trade and 
heightened volatility of commodities, and the positive correlation between the share 
of industry in the economy and the increase in per capita incomes. (Another set of 
explanations, which we will not consider in this paper, is the political economy of 
commodities production, where resource extraction in the hard and particularly the 
energy commodities sectors is often regarded as cause of the wars, corruption and 
human rights abuses which characterise many low income commodity dependent 
economies). Since, as we shall see, there are reasons why much of this received 
wisdom is open to question in the light of recent developments in the global 
economy, it is helpful to briefly recap these arguments. 
 
The Enclave Nature of Commodity Production 
 
In 1950, Singer, one of the leading economists of the post World War Two era, 
produced a seminal critique of the enclave nature of production in the commodities 
sector (Singer, 1950). In this analysis he addressed the complexion of hard 
commodities production in low income economies and argued that, as a general rule, 
the extraction of these hard commodities occurred in isolation from the local 
economies in which the mines were based. As a consequence of their high capital 
intensity, few jobs were created, and there were weak linkages to local suppliers. 
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Instead, as the title of his seminal paper implied (“The Distribution of Gains between 
Investing and Borrowing Countries.”) the beneficial spillovers from commodity 
production were largely reaped in the high-income countries where the large foreign-
owned mining companies were based: 
 
„I would suggest that if the proper economic test of investment is the multiplier 
effect in the form of cumulative additions to income, employment, capital, 
technical knowledge, and growth of external economies, then a good deal of 
the investment in underdeveloped countries [hard commodities sectors] which 
we used to consider as “foreign” [and taking place in low income economies] 
should in fact be considered as domestic investment on the part of the 
industrialised countries‟ (Singer, 1950: 475) 
 
Closely linked to this argument by Singer was the assertion that the hard 
commodities sector offered little scope for technological progress and had few 
external economies. Singer (1950) asserted (since this was backed with little 
evidence), that the hard commodities sector was characterised by low technology, 
limiting the learning opportunities provided to the local economy. Further, Singer 
argued, specialisation in the export of raw materials diverted scarce entrepreneurial 
activity and domestic investment away from manufacturing. Whilst admitting that 
these speculations were a “tantalizingly inconclusive business”, Singer argued that in 
contrast to a specialisation in commodities, manufacturing provided greater scope for 
technological progress, for skills development, for the creation of new demand, and 
for the demonstration effect which was promoting of diversified economic 
development. In summary, weak linkages would result from a combination of two 
factors. First, there was the sectoral effect, with commodities intrinsically having litle 
scope for linkages and technological spillovers. And, second, linkages within the low 
income producing economies would be limited, since whatever linkages did emerge 
would be reaped in the high income home economies of the lead commodity firms. 
 
The enclave character of commodity extraction in developing economies was 
reflected in, and to some extent caused by the enclave oriented development of 
infrastructure in many developing economies in the post-colonial period. As a general 
rule, roads, ports and often also power and water facilities were developed to 
facilitate the extraction of commodities, their transport to the coast and their shipping 
to final markets abroad. This restricted pattern of infrastructural development then 
limited the development of industrial linkages, since commodity extraction generally 
took place in areas distant from settlement and the industrial sector. 
 
Declining Commodities-Manufactures Terms of Trade and the Price 
Volatility of Commodities 
 
Until the end of the Second World War it had generally been assumed that the 
commodities-manufactures terms of trade would move in favour of commodities. This 
view was challenged in 1950 by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). Focusing on the 
prices of UK exports (predominantly manufactures) and UK imports (predominantly 
commodities) in the period between 1878 and 1938, they drew exactly the opposite 
conclusion to the prevailing conventional wisdom. Drawing on this evidence, they 
argued that the long-term trend was in fact for the prices of commodities to fall 
relative to those of manufactures.  
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The primary explanation which Singer and Prebisch provided was that these 
declining terms of trade were driven by labour market differences. Full employment in 
the high-income manufacturing economies meant that cost-push pricing would result 
from the higher wages demanded by powerful trades unions, and the prices of 
exports of these economies would consequently increase. In low income countries, 
by contrast, surplus labour and the weakness of trades unions would not lead to the 
same cost-plus pricing, and the prices of their exports would either remain stable or 
decrease. In addition, Prebisch and Singer believed that the nature of demand for 
different products and the development of synthetic substitutes for natural resources 
would further depress commodity prices. Singer argued in subsequent analysis that 
manufacturing was subject to more Schumpeterian innovation rents (that is, difficult-
to-copy technology) than in the commodities sectors, and as a consequence the 
barriers to entry in manufacturing were relatively high, protecting the incomes of 
producers in these sectors. (Singer, 1981)   
 
The terms of trade are a ratio of the prices of commodities to the price of 
manufactures For the first two decades after the war the price of manufactures was 
stable, but between 1972 and 1993 the average prices of manufactures rose sharply, 
by more than four hundred percent. (Figure 2). In the same period, the prices of 
commodities were either stable or declining. This was despite two short-lived 
commodity price booms between 1951 and 1953, and 1972 and 1974. The earlier 
1950s boom was not spread equally across all commodities, and the prices of energy 
commodities remained stable around their 1949 values. The 1972-1974 price boom 
affected all three families of commodities, including (and very markedly) the price of 
energy commodities. A significant feature of both of these short-lived price booms is 
that they were driven by an (as it turned out, unwarranted) expectation of future 
demand growth for commodities, and temporary interruptions in supply (a 
combination of poor harvests in both periods and war-induced interruptions to supply 
and strikes in the second boom).  
 
Figure 2: Index of average prices of manufactures, 1950-1992 
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Source: Compiled from Pfaffenzeller and Newbold, 2007 
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There is some controversy about the extent of the decline in the manufactures-
commodities terms of trade (arising in part from the choice of the beginning- and end-
points of the price analysis). However, the balance of informed opinion is that the 
Singer-Prebisch hypothesis on the declining terms of trade (based as we saw on 
limited analysis of very partial data on the trading experience of the UK) is confirmed, 
not just for the second half of the twentieth century, but for at least the whole of the 
twentieth century, and perhaps for the nineteenth century as well. There is less 
agreement on how long this terms of trade reversal will endure.2  
 
Beyond the declining terms of trade of commodities, lies the adverse impacts arising 
from their price volatility. This is a well-observed, and uncontested phenomenon. 
Cashin and McDermott (2002), documented a downward trend in the terms of trade 
of around one per cent per year over the 140 year time period between 1862 and 
1999. But their judgement was that price volatility was a more damaging challenge to 
producers than a predictable and stable decline in commodity prices. Moreover, they 
observed an increase in the price volatility of commodities, both in the magnitude of 
price changes, and in their frequency over time. Price- slumps tended to be of a 
longer duration than price-booms.  
The demonstration effect of industrialisation, and normal patterns 
of growth 
 
It has long been recognised that there is a strong and positive relationship between 
per capita incomes and the share of industry in GDP. Although this relationship 
weakens as per capita incomes increase, this occurs at levels beyond those 
prevailing in most low and middle income economies. Drawing on earlier analysis by 
Chenery (1960) and Taylor (1969), a widely-cited UNIDO study undertaken in the 
late 1970s evidenced this correlation, taking account of country-size (since countries 
with large populations in this period of shallow-globalisation allowed for economies of 
scale in production) and for the share of natural resources in GDP (UNIDO, 1980). It 
was concluded from these comparative studies of industrial structure that a “normal” 
growth-path over time could be identified. This “normal” pattern of structural 
transformation is shown in Figure 3, based on the relationship between MVA and 
GDP per capita in 1970 for Uganda, India, Korea and the US (and, in the case of the 
US, for 1980 as well). At low levels of per capita income, industry accounted for only 
a small share of GDP – for example, Uganda (at 9.2 percent). As per capita incomes 
rose, this share began to grow rapidly – as in the case of India (14.2 percent) and 
Korea (17.8 percent). Further up the per capita income scale, the share of MVA grew 
even higher, reaching its peak with the US share of 26.6 percent in 1970. However, 
when incomes increased even further, the contribution of MVA to GDP began to fall 
back below its peak as the growth in demand switched from manufactured goods to 
services. This falling share (from 26.6 to 22.8 percent) is indicated in Figure 3 for the 
US in 1980. (After 1980, the falling share of MVA in GDP in the US began to reflect 
the outsourcing of manufacturing to China and other low cost suppliers, hence 
exaggerating the fall in the contribution of MVA at very high levels of per capita 
income). Figure 3.5 presents a general story. More detailed analysis showed that the 
larger the size of a country, the greater the share of MVA in GDP, and the greater the 
concentration of commodities in exports, the smaller this share. Neither of these 
                                            
2
  For a summary of this evidence, see Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011, Chapter 3. 
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qualifications ruled out the positive association between per capita incomes on the 
share of manufacturing in GDP.  
 
Figure 3: The “normal” relationship between per capita incomes and share of 
manufacturing in GDP, Uganda, India, Korea and the USA (1970), and USA (1980)  
 
Source: Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011 
 
Three primary reasons were provided to explain this “normal” pattern of growth, away 
from resources towards industry, and within this, a gradual shift from light to heavy 
industry. The first was the elasticity of demand, that is the intensity of consumption of 
particular types of goods at particular levels of income and prices. “Engels Law” 
argued that at low per capita incomes, consumer demand would be concentrated on 
soft commodities (such as food) and industries using soft commodities (such as 
apparel, footwear and furniture). But as incomes rose, so the demand for these 
products would expand less rapidly, and demand for other more sophisticated 
industrial products and services would grow. It is important to bear in mind the time-
period in which these strategic conclusions were developed since in most cases, the 
economies whose structures were being measured were predominantly operating as 
relatively closed economies, selling into local markets. (Nowadays, with firms selling 
into global markets, the structure of demand in any particular economy may be 
relatively unimportant, particularly in the case of small economies. The production 
structure in a country might therefore not reflect the consumption structure in that 
country, and hence a low income economy might develop an economic structure 
appropriate for selling products to high-income consumers in distant markets).  
 
Second, closely related to this income elasticity of demand was the price elasticity of 
demand for natural commodities. The development of substitutes for many primary 
products (synthetic rubber for natural rubber, artificial sweeteners for sugar, fibre-
optics for copper) meant that technological progress in other sectors dampened the 
demand for natural resources, particularly if the price of these natural resources 
grew. Third, it was argued that the skill and technological barriers to entry in many 
commodity sectors, particularly those in agricultural commodities, were much lower 
than those in manufacturing. Hence, economies would begin in low-skill commodity 
sectors and then make a natural progression to higher skill – and higher wage – 
industrial sectors. 
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For all of these reasons, it was believed that the natural – and indeed desirable – 
change in economic structure would be a transition from a commodity-intensive to an 
industrial economic structure. 
 
 
3. HAS ANYTHING CHANGED? 
 
A number of factors are forcing a rethink of this inherited wisdom on the relationship 
between commodities production and industrialisation. One is that there is an 
increasing awareness that the historical relationship between manufacturing and the 
resource sector is more complex than has been portrayed in much of the literature. 
Attention is being redirected to the Staples Theory, initially developed in the 1920s 
and 1930s. This sought to explain the development of manufacturing in Canada as 
arising in large part from linkages to the export-oriented fish and fur soft commodities 
sectors (Innis, 1957). The development of manufacturing in the US in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, as well as the recent development of industry in Australia 
and Norway can also be directly traced back to the synergies arising between 
commodities production and industry (Wright and Czelusta, 2004). Similarly, 
Sweden‟s industrialisation after the 1850s was driven by export booms in cereals and 
sawn wood, and, later, by pulp, paper and iron ore (Blomström and Kokko, 2007).  
 
Each of these historical experiences involved a positive symbiosis in which industry 
was stimulated by linkages from the soft, hard and energy commodities sectors. In 
turn, the capabilities developed in industry fed back into commodities production by 
reducing costs and enabling the exploitation of less well-endowed mineral seams, oil 
deposits, and agricultural land. These synergies between commodities and 
manufacturing can also be evidenced at the firm-level (Blomström and Kokko, 2007). 
For example, Nokia‟s business origins were in pulp and paper milling in the 1860s 
and this provided the surplus for Nokia - drawing on its dynamic capabilities - to 
move subsequently into cable manufacturing, and more recently into mobile 
telecommunications.  
 
Moreover, a variety of studies have challenged the Sachs and Warner analysis. 
Davies (1995) examined the performance of mineral and non-mineral economies in 
relation to GNP per capita and social indicators such as the Human Development 
Index. He concluded that there was no evidence to support the contention that 
commodity-dependent economies had performed less well in respect of sustained 
growth or human development indices. To the contrary, whilst oil producers did best, 
in most cases mineral economies outperformed non-mineral economies. Lederman 
and Maloney employed additional estimation techniques, using time-series data that 
allowed for a more sophisticated analysis of the dynamic interrelationship between 
growth and the commodities sector (Lederman and Maloney, 2007). They also 
adopted a different proxy for resource-intensity that is, net resource exports per 
capita (rather than the share of natural resources in GDP adopted by Sachs and 
Warner). Utilising this definition of resource intensity, they concluded that Norway, 
New Zealand, Canada, Finland and Australia ranked as the most resource-intensive 
economies rather than economies such as the  DRC and Papua New Guinea in the 
Sachs and Warner analysis. Other corrections were also made, including using an 
average price over the period under analysis in order to take into account high price 
volatility. The consequence of these assumptions was not just that the natural 
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resource curse found by Sachs and Warner disappeared, but that there was  a mildly 
positive correlation between resource intensity and GDP growth (Lederman and 
Maloney, 2007). Similar findings were reached by Manzano and Rigobón (2007) and 
Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2007).  
 
Two major conclusions emerge from these various attempts to verify empirically the 
Resource Curse theory. The first is that in some cases – countries such as the US 
and Sweden, and firms such as Nokia – there is demonstrated evidence of a positive 
synergy between commodities and manufacturing. And, second, where commodity 
dependence is extreme, this is more often a result of the unrelated 
underdevelopment of the industrial sector rather than as a consequence of the 
destructive impact of commodities production on industry. Thus what shows up and 
is interpreted as a manufacturing sector weakened by a commodities specialisation, 
is in fact often a commodities specialisation in an economy with no or little history of 
industrial development. 
 
Leaving aside these theoretical challenges to the empirical analysis of the 
relationship between commodities and industrialisation, there have been a series of 
developments in the global economy in recent years which provide new opportunities 
for economies specialising in commodities. Key amongst these has been the very 
rapid rise of the Chinese economy. 
 
The Re-emergence of China as a Leading Economy 
 
For most of the last two millennia, China and India were the two largest global 
economies (Maddison.2007). In 1820, it was estimated that China accounted for 
more than one third of global GDP. In 1969, this share had fallen to less than four 
percent. But, since the mid 1980s, China has grown at a compound growth rate of 
almost ten percent p.a. By 2006 its share had re-grown to around 17 percent of 
global GDP, and before 2030 it is likely to once again become the world‟s largest 
economy.  
 
By virtue of its size, China‟s rapid growth and global footprint cannot be ignored and 
has a major impact on other economies (Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011). It is possible 
to distinguish between complementary and competitive impacts on other countries, 
the former leading to win-win outcomes for both China and other economies, and the 
latter to win-lose outcomes. It is also possible to distinguish between the direct 
impacts of China‟s growth on other economies (arising from bilateral links with China) 
and the indirect impacts which arise as a consequence of a reshaping of the global 
economy resulting from China‟s rapid rise to once again become the world‟s largest 
economy (Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris, 2010). 
 
There are a variety of ways in which the rise of the Chinese economy affects 
industrialisation strategies in general, and in commodity exporting economies in 
particular. These arise from the particular growth trajectory of the Chinese economy. 
Beginning with the direct impact of China‟s very rapid industrial development on other 
countries, there is increasing evidence of the displacement in many countries of 
manufacturing production destined for the local market (Jenkins, 2008; Morris and 
Einhorn, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2009;). But it is the indirect impacts which may in fact be 
more significant, and since these are not as easy to understand and document as the 
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direct impacts arising from bilateral trade relations with China, these are worthy of 
more in-depth discussion. 
 
Returning to the Singer-Prebisch thesis on the terms of trade, we can observe that 
one of the major factors motivating the drive to industrialisation was the income 
elasticity of demand for commodities, and especially for soft commodities. It was 
argued that as incomes grew, so the growth in demand for commodities would lag 
that of manufactures and services. There is certainly compelling evidence that this is 
the case for soft and hard commodities (but less so for energy commodities where 
demand continues to rise as incomes grow). But the question is at what level of 
incomes the demand for commodities falls off. Here it is evident that in the case of 
most hard and energy commodities, the income levels at which the demand elasticity 
falls (beyond $15,000PPP per capita in 2000) are currently some considerable way 
above the current per capita income in China ($6,200). This falling-off of demand is 
evidenced for aluminium, copper and steel, from which it can be seen that China is 
still at a relatively immature stage in its per capita consumption of these commodities. 
A similar pattern can be observed across the range of hard and energy commodities, 
but less so in the case of food soft commodities, where Chinese consumption 
patterns are much closer to the norm of high income economies. China‟s 
commodities-intensive demand trajectory is driven by its exceptionally high 
investment rate, and particularly by investments in infrastructure, by growing 
urbanisation and by the manufacturing-intensity of its economy. 3  
 
                                            
3
 These drivers of China‟s high elasticity of demand for commodities are discussed in detail in Farooki 
and Kaplinsky, 2011, Chapter 4. 
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Figure 4. Per capita consumption of base metals 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2006 
 
It is not widely recognised, but China is the worlds largest producer of most of the 
world‟s soft, hard and energy commodities. Yet, towards the end of the twentieth 
century, domestic production failed to meet domestic demand. China‟s resource 
intensive growth path meant that domestic supplies of most commodities could not 
keep up with demand, and in each of the three families of commodities, despite high 
and increasing domestic production, China became an increasingly significant global 
importer (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: China’s share of global production and global imports, 1990-2009 (%) 
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Source: Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011 
 
After the turn of the millennium, global suppliers were unable to keep pace with 
China‟s growing appetite for imported commodities. In the soft commodities sectors, 
there were increasing limits to low-cost supplies, exacerbated by the growing impact 
of climate change and the growth in demand for food from other low income 
economies (FAO/OECD, 2007). In both hard commodities and energy commodities, 
there is a long gestation period involved in ramping-up supply. Moreover, as in the 
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soft commodities sectors, low-cost sources of supply have largely been exhausted,, 
as there is little scope for expanding the extensive margin, and intensification of 
production (primarily through irrigation) is investment-intensive. Moreover, climate 
change is disrupting agricultural production systems. As a consequence, after 2002, 
global commodity prices began to rise sharply, initially for hard commodities and 
energy commodities and then, after 2007 for soft commodities as well (Figure 6). 
This rise in prices was interrupted by the financial crisis of 2008, whilst the pre-2008 
price upturn, the 2008-9 downturn and the post 2010 upturn were exacerbated by 
speculative financial investors.4 These trend-augmenting impacts of the financial 
sector on prices reflected underlying supply-demand fundamentals, and this provided 
a structural underpinning for the prolonged rise in commodity prices after 2002 
(Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011; Akyuz, 2011). Although contested, there is widespread 
recognition that the squeeze on supplies will be sustained at least for another decade 
for most commodities, notwithstanding the onset of frequent price bubbles as the 
financial sector exploits these gaps in supply (Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011). 
 
Figure 6: Monthly Averages of UNCTAD Commodity Indexes, Jan 2000 – 
November 2010 (2000=100) 
 
Source: UNCTAD Statistics online  
<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en> 
(accessed May 2011). 
 
At the same time as China‟s demand helped to push up the prices of commodities, its 
growing competence in manufacturing also placed pressure on the prices of 
manufactures. Between 2000 and 2010 China‟s share of global manufacturing value 
added grew from 7 to 15 percent. In 2005 it surpassed Germany as the largest 
exporter of manufactures (measured in terms of gross output value rather than MVA), 
and in 2010 it overtook Japan to become the second largest global producer of 
manufactures (measured by MVA).5 From the mid-1990s, China has increasingly 
become the “world‟s factory”. A key driver of this growing manufacturing pre-
eminence has been China‟s low costs of production.  
                                            
4
 See Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011, Chapter 6. 
5
  All figures calculated from calculated from UNIDO MVA Explorer(accessed May 2011) 
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These developments have had a major impact on the global price of manufactures, 
where two trends have emerged. The first is the trajectory of the prices of 
manufactures as a whole. Between 1970 and 1992 the prices of manufactures had 
risen by 436 percent. But after 1992, this rising trend was broken. The average prices 
of manufactures fell for  more than decade and it took 12 years before the 1992 price 
levels were regained (Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011). After 2006, the prices of 
manufactures began to rise again, but at a slower pace than during the 1970s and 
the 1980s.  
 
The second noteworthy feature is that these overall trends in the prices of 
manufactures masked rather different behaviour in the prices of different types of 
manufactures. The “average unit price” reflected some sectors in which prices went 
up, and others in which they fell. However, it is clear from an examination of 
disaggregated prices that the price movements of different types of manufactures 
were closely related to the growth of China‟s manufactured exports. This can be seen 
from Figure 7 which shows the pattern of price changes of products imported into the 
EU, Japan and the US between 1989 and 2007, based on a detailed disaggregation 
of global trade (at the six- and eight-digit trade levels). In each of the three major 
importing regions, the price trajectory of the 300 largest Chinese exports was 
compared with those of the same products exported by low-income, middle-income 
and high-income economies, distinguishing between resource-sector, low-tech, 
medium-tech and high-tech products. With the exception of the high-tech group, the 
propensity of China‟s export product prices to fall was higher than any other of the 
exporting regions. These results confirm an earlier study of the association between 
China‟s exports and the export prices of other economies selling into the EU between 
1989 and 2001 (Kaplinsky and Santos Paulino, 2006). Again focusing on the 
percentage of sectors experiencing falling prices, the numbers were 26 percent for 
low income countries, 18 percent for lower-middle income economies, 17 percent for 
upper-middle income economies and nine percent for high-income economies.  By 
contrast, more than 30 percent of China‟s manufacturing export sectors were 
characterised by falling prices. The impact of China‟s export competitiveness on the 
global prices of manufactures – predominantly an impact which led to falling prices – 
is evidenced in both studies.  
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Figure 7: Percentage of sectors with falling prices, 1989-2007 
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Source: Drawn from data in Fu, Kaplinsky and Zhang, 2009) 
 
The downward pressure on the prices of traded manufactures began to abate as 
manufacturing wages in coastal regions of China – the heart of its exporting sector – 
begun to rise rapidly after 2007. However, much of the impact of this wage pressure 
on prices was held back by rapidly rising productivity in Chinese exporting firms. 
Moreover, low levels of value added in export oriented assembly industries and the 
low share of labour costs in total costs meant that the impact of China‟s rising labour 
costs on final product prices has been muted. Further, many Chinese firms operating 
in the coastal areas, and northern firms who have subsidiaries in these regions and 
who subcontract to Chinese firms, have begun to move their operations inland. 
where wages are lower. Large investments by the Chinese government in 
infrastructure also reduce the costs of producing in the interior. Finally, many of the 
rising prices in China‟s manufactured exports were fuelled as much by the rising 
input costs arising as a consequence of the boom in commodity prices as by rising 
wage costs.  
 
And beyond China lies a global reserve army of labour. By 2030, India will have a 
larger and much younger population than China. Other Asian economies such as 
Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines are also heavily populated, have high rates of 
unemployment and are increasingly being targeted as source of alternative final 
assembly as Chinese wage costs increase. We can thus anticipate that the global 
prices of manufactures, which had began to rise towards the end of the first decade 
of the 21st century will continue to face severe competitive pressures in the future. 
 
Thus, it is evident that as a consequence of the structure of China‟s growth and the 
size of its economy, it is having a major impact on the trajectory of prices of both 
commodities and manufactures. Of course, China is not the only economy driving 
these price developments. Other, predominantly Asian, economies have also 
developed significant capabilities in manufacturing, and India, Brazil and other rapidly 
growing low per capita income are also increasing their demand for commodities. 6 
The upshot of these trends is that the terms of trade – for so long, as we have seen, 
                                            
6
 For example, coffee consumption is growing very rapidly in emerging economies, particularly in 
Brazil (which became the largest consumer of coffee in 2010) and China. 
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turning against commodities – have now begun to turn in their favour (Figure 8). In 
the light of the continued growth in demand for commodities, the long gestation 
period in increasing the supply of many commodities and the exhaustion of low-cost 
supplies, there is a strong possibility that this terms of trade reversal will be sustained 
at least for another decade, if not longer. 
 
Figure 8: The commodities-manufactures terms of trade, 1949-2007 
1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
 
Source: Compiled from data from Pfaffenzeller  et al (2007) 
 
The Fracturing of Global Value Chains and the Growth of 
Outsourcing 
 
China‟s transition from an inwardly focused and largely rural based agricultural 
economy to becoming the “factory of the world” was critically dependent on 
developments outside China. It was not just that market access barriers were 
lowered in major consuming economies, but also that the transnational corporations 
(TNCs) which dominated the manufacturing sectors in these high income countries 
went through a fundamental reorganisation from the late 1960s, gathering pace 
rapidly after that. The roots to this reorganisation lay in a particular strategic 
response to the growing pressures of global competition. In essence an increasing 
number of northern firms discovered the attractions of concentrating on their core 
competences (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). This required them to focus on processes 
and products in which they had a unique competitive advantage, which were difficult 
to copy and which were valued by their customers. Everything else which did not 
meet these three objectives was outsourced. This allowed the firm to concentrate on 
what it did best and to invest in the maintenance of its dynamic competitive 
advantage. It also allowed them to play off suppliers against each other in order to 
reduce costs, improve quality and to optimise the deliveries required to achieve lean 
production. 
 
What at first initially began as a programme of domestic outsourcing, rapidly spread 
into structured programmes of global outsourcing. Lead firms analysed their chains, 
sliced them up into increasingly segmented links, and then played conductor to a 
global orchestra of competing suppliers (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005). 
These global value chain lead firms actively sought suppliers in low-cost 
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environments, and in many respects the export-oriented miracle of east Asia was as 
much a creation of global buyers as of global suppliers (Feenstra and Hamilton, 
2005). Walmart is an excellent  example of a global buyer exercising this role – by 
2005, more than 70 percent of its non-food offerings were sourced from China and it 
had become China‟s eighth largest trading partner, importing more from China than 
either the UK or Russia.  But it was not just the retailers who were sourcing from 
China. Indeed, in the manufacturing sector, China was only one of a number of 
players in a complex process of lead firms concentrating on their core competences 
and outsourcing the production of component production and sub-assembly and 
final-assembly across a global stage. A good example of this process of global 
outsourcing can be seen in regard to the cost structure of the iPhone (Table 1). 
Although the phone is labelled “Made in China”, only a small proportion of total costs 
($6.50 out of $178.96) are added in China.  
 
Table 1: Sources of value added in Apple iPhone, 2009 
 
Source: Xing and Detert, 2010 (drawing on Rassweiller, 2009) 
 
The critical lesson to be gleaned with regard to the commodities sector from this brief 
review of the extension of global value chains in the industrial sector is that lead firms 
in global value chains are actively seeking to outsource their non-core competence 
activities. This has great importance for the development of linkages from the 
commodity sector and we will return to this issue below. 
 
The global mining industry has undergone a radical restructuring of its historically 
dominant production model. Mines have moved away from a high level of vertical 
integration towards outsourcing almost every stage in the mining process to 
independent firms (Urzua (2007). This incorporates not only the provision of 
equipment and capital goods, as well as inputs such as chemicals, but also key 
knowledge services. This has led to the emergence of specialised knowledge 
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intensive mining services providers (SKIMS), offering not only specialised services 
but also other high technology inputs. Companies such as SRK in South Africa, 
which started as a service provider to Anglo American have grown into a global 
consulting firm in the mining industry. Similarly, Bell Equipment in South Africa 
started by producing equipment for the forestry sector, and then diversified into the 
mining sector. Having built competences in the domestic mining sector, it then 
became a supplier of these machines into a number of global markets, including  the 
mining, construction, sugar and forestry sectors (Kaplinsky and Mhlongo, 1997, 
Walker and Jourdan, 2003). Global Mining companies are also actively involved in 
building capacities in local suppliers. BHP Billiton Metals Base has put into operation 
an extensive supplier development program in Chile, to significantly upgrade a 
considerable proportion of their current suppliers. The aim is to upgrade not only 
production capabilities, but also to allow some to move into specialised knowledge 
services and to operate in the global market place as world class suppliers (Marin, 
Navas-Aleman and Perez, 2009).  
 
 
4. AN OVERVIEW ON LINKAGE DEVELOPMENT: 
HIRSCHMAN’S THEORY OF LINKAGES  
 
An apocryphal story is often told of the tourist visiting Ireland who stops and asks 
someone in a rural area - “Excuse me please, can you tell me the way to Dublin”, 
only to be answered with “Oh, if I were going to Dublin, I wouldn‟t start from here”! In 
other words, it may be that many countries which are heavily dependent on 
commodities would prefer to have different economic structures, perhaps to have the 
industrial competences (and the per capita incomes!) of Japan, South Korea, 
Germany and China. However, this is wishful thinking. Their economies are what 
they are (as was the tourist, lost in the Irish countryside), and they have to work with 
these structures, even if they wish to transform them into something different.   
 
Fortunately, as we have seen, the prospects for diversification in commodity 
producing economies have been lifted by three factors. First, the reconsideration  of 
the link between commodities, industrialisation and growth does not support the 
gloom that has often characterised the challenge of structural transformation in low 
income economies. That is, the Resource Curse‟s assertion that commodity 
specialisation reduces growth is unwarranted. Second, after very many decades of 
declining relative prices, there is solid evidence that higher commodity prices are 
here to stay, and for some years ahead. Third, many of the lead-firms in commodity 
value chains do not seek to become the enclave firms observed by Singer in 
developing economies commodities production in the 1950s. On the contrary, as a 
general rule, large commodity producing companies investing in the developing world 
(most of whom are foreign-owned) are actively searching to reduce their costs and to 
outsource a range of activities which are not within their core competences. In so 
doing, they also seek to deepen their specialisation in the rent-rich niches which they 
currently hold. 
 
This is not to say that no obstacles stand in the way of industrial diversification – the 
problems of managing exchange rate appreciation remain and commodity prices 
have become increasingly volatile and these require the development of appropriate 
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smoothing and counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. There are often also large 
technological and skill barriers to entry into manufacturing But leaving aside these 
continuing challenges we now turn to the prospects opened up for a synergistic link 
between the exploitation of commodities and the development of industry. In order to 
better understand this potential we begin by turning to a perspective developed by 
Hirschman, one of the pioneers in post-war development studies. 
 
Hirschman characterised the development process in the following terms - 
…”development is essentially the record of how one thing leads to another” 
(Hirschman, 1981:75). In other words, successful economic growth is inevitably an 
incremental (but not necessarily slow) unfolding of linkages between related 
economic activities.7 
 
Building on Innis‟s Staples Theory, Hirschman proposed three major types of 
linkages from the commodities sector. The first are fiscal linkages, the resource rents 
which the government is able to harvest from the commodities sectors in the form of 
corporate taxes, royalties and taxes on the incomes of employees. These rents can 
be used to promote industrial development in sectors unrelated to commodities. The 
second major category of linkages are consumption linkages, that is the demand for 
the output of other sectors arising from the incomes earned in the commodities 
sector. The third form of linkages are production linkages, both forward (processing 
commodities) and backward (producing inputs to be utilised in commodity 
production).  
 
Hirschman (1981) argued that the fiscal linkages generally tended to be limited and 
provide no guidance as to which sectors the commodity rents should be used to 
develop - the “ability to tax the enclave is hardly a sufficient condition for vigorous 
economic growth. For the fiscal linkage to be an effective development mechanism, 
the ability to tax must be combined with the ability to invest productively. [But] here 
lies precisely the weakness of fiscal linkages in comparison to the more direct 
production and consumption linkages… [since] no… guidance [on which sectors to 
invest] is forthcoming when a portion of the income stream earned in an enclave is 
siphoned off for the purpose of irrigating other areas of the economy” (ibid: 68-69). 
Hirschman also believed that in the context of poorly-developed manufacturing 
sectors in many low income economies, consumption linkages would be felt abroad 
as the needs of domestic consumers would be met through imports. For Hirschman, 
therefore, the direct forward and backward linkages were the most likely to lead to 
the development of a more diversified economic structure. In other words, by relating 
directly to the output structure of the commodities sector, “one thing” would indeed 
“lead to another”. 
 
In this Discussion Paper we will focus on the direct production linkages between the 
commodities sector and the manufacturing sector. But before we do so, it is helpful to 
augment the Hirschman framework in three ways. First, within the direct production 
linkage category we propose to add a third form of production linkage, which we term 
the “horizontal linkage” (Figure 9). This relates particularly to backward linkages and 
reflects a process in which suppliers who develop capabilities in the supply of inputs 
                                            
7
 This approach has in recent years been echoed in the analysis of manufacturing development arising 
from related sectors (Hasuman, Rodrik and Sabel, 2007). 
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to the commodities sector, subsequently develop capabilities which have a wide 
range of applications in other sectors. Figure 9 illustrates the various forms of 
production linkage – backward, forward and horizontal - for the timber sector. 
Backward linkages arise from logging to logging equipment and from logging 
equipment to engineering, and forward linkages from timber to sawmilling and to 
furniture. Horizontal linkages are generated from logging equipment to cane-growing 
(as occurred in the case of Bell Equipment in South Africa, Kaplinsky and  Mhlongo, 
1997), and from cane-growing to sugar production. Horizontal linkages also are 
generated from sawmilling to the construction sector.  
 
Figure 9: Backward, Forward and Horizontal Linkages from the Timber Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focusing in on horizontal linkages, as Hausmann and Rodrik have observed, “the 
probability that a country will develop the capability to be good at producing one good 
is related to its installed capacity in the production of other similar, or nearby goods 
for which the currently existing productive capabilities can be easily adapted.” 
(Hausman and Klinger, 2007:13). Beyond timber, a good example is the 
development of domestic backward linkages in the supply of hydraulically-operated 
machinery to the South African mining sector (Pogue,, 2008). Here specific 
geological conditions led to the development of unique capabilities in hydraulics, 
which then allowed supplier firms to sell equipment into a range of sectors not related 
to the mining sector.  
 
The second augmentation of the Hirschman framework addresses the sectoral 
specificity of linkages.8 It relates back to the three families of commodities identified 
in Figure 1 above. There are four ways in which the type of commodity has an 
important impact on economic institutions and the paths which linkages might take as 
“one thing leads to another”: First, the complexity of individual value chains affects 
the extent of backward and forward linkages. Some commodities require relatively 
few inputs and can be processed in a limited number of ways. This provides less 
scope for the development of linkages and for spillovers to other sectors. Second, the 
                                            
8
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technological intensity of individual value chains will limit the extent to which local 
capabilities are able to respond as efficient suppliers and as efficient beneficiators of 
commodities. Third, the nature of the production processes involved in extracting and 
producing commodities affects the level and distribution of income streams. For 
example, small scale distributed production systems in agriculture contribute to the 
distribution of incomes, whereas large scale capital intensive mines build or reinforce 
income inequality. These production characteristics will in turn determine the nature 
and extent of consumption linkages. And, fourth, the extent to which individual 
commodities reflect high and concentrated resource rents will have a bearing on 
politics and governance, and hence on the capacity of the state and the local 
economy to develop forward, backward and horizontal linkages. 
 
The third augmentation to the Hirschman framework is that there is a distinction to be 
made in forward linkages between the processing of commodities and what has 
come to be called the “beneficiation” of commodities. Processing involves a 
deepening of value added as a commodity is refined or processed prior to being 
exported. For example, iron ore is processed into steel, copper is smelted, timber is 
transformed into veneer, and cotton is rendered purer through ginning.  In this sense, 
the “processing” of raw materials is located in the same, or a closely-related industry  
as extraction. By contrast, beneficiation describes a process of transformation in 
which the commodity is used in a different manufacturing activity. For example, 
aluminium may be transformed into engine cylinder heads or into pots and pans, 
cotton is spun and woven into textiles and wood is used in the production of furniture. 
Processing requires an enhanced technical understanding of the commodity in order 
to augment it, whereas beneficiating requires entirely different production and market 
destination skill sets.  
 
 
5. A NEW ERA: CAN COMMODITIES REINFORCE 
INDUSTRIALISATION?  
 
Based on the preceding discussion we can draw together two sets of issues which 
illuminate our understanding of linkage development in the modern era. The first is 
the distinction between backward and forward linkages, where we are informed by a 
long history of discussion on industrial diversification. The second is the growth of 
corporate outsourcing. This is a more recent development which leads us to believe 
that there is a qualitative difference between the contemporary determinants of the 
nature and extent of linkages to those which existed in the 1950-1990 period in which 
the Resource Curse perspective became the conventional wisdom. 
Backward or Forward? The Path of Least Resistance 
 
Building on the commodities sector to promote linkages and thus to develop the 
manufacturing sector has long been a preoccupation of policy-makers. But 
overwhelmingly, their attention has been given to forward, downstream linkages. In 
the soft-commodities sector, governments have sought to promote the food 
processing sector, both on-farm and off-farm. Diversification in industrial soft-
commodities, such as timber and cotton, has been complemented with policies 
designed to promote the processing of raw materials. In timber this has led to support 
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programmes for chipboard, veneer, plywood and furniture, and in cotton to the 
promotion of the textile sector. In hard commodities, governments have taken actions 
to encourage downstream processing, in some cases with direct equity contributions, 
in others by providing loans and a range of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives. A 
particularly focused government support programme for forward linkages has been 
developed in Botswana to encourage the cutting and polishing of diamonds (Mbayi, 
2011). In energy commodities, governments in oil-producing countries have both 
encouraged and invested in the construction of refineries, for example in Angola 
(Teka, 2010). In many of these commodity sectors, particularly those which have are 
characterised by large economies of scale and heavy capital costs, governments 
have provided substantial funding to promote these downstream linkages.  
 
There are also cases of government support for backward linkages. These have 
predominantly involved two types of linkages. The first has been localisation, either in 
the form of taking equity shares local ownership in commodity production (on the 
assumption that this will lead to backward linkages to manufacturing) or regulations 
involving the employment of national citizens. The second has been local content 
policies. Unlike the forward linkage policy agenda which has frequently involved the 
heavy commitment of government funds, including as a co-investor, in the case of 
backward linkages most of the support policies have been “passive”, involving the 
establishment of targets (such as on local content and employment of local citizens) 
mandated to foreign-owned companies operating in the commodities sector, In 
general, in many low income countries, particularly in Africa, the performance of the 
commodity producing firms in meeting these targets has been poorly-monitored. A 
pervasive trend, affecting government attitudes to the promotion of both forward and 
backward linkages, has been the frequent assumption that local ownership in 
commodity producing sectors will lead to a broader and deeper pattern of linkages. 
 
Why have governments not paid more attention to backward linkages, particularly in 
the hard and energy commodities sectors? In large part this has been because (as 
we have seen above) the inherited wisdom has been that the commodities sector is 
an enclave activity. There has also been confusion on the potential for technological 
spillovers from backward linkages. On the one hand there is the legacy of Singer„s 
argument that the commodities sector is characterised by low-technology, and on the 
other hand, other commentators argue that, particularly in the hard and energy 
commodities sector, backward linkages (for example, in mine construction) require 
such large investments and complicated technologies that the barriers to entry are 
insuperable. 
 
This negative perspective on backward linkages is unwarranted for a number of 
reasons, - the character of technology in resource exploitation, the degree of 
technological change in the commodities sector, and the scope for the provision of 
intermediate products and services. Turning first to the character of technology in 
resource extraction.. A key characteristic of virtually every deposit of minerals, 
precious stones, oil, gas and coal is that it is location-specific. No two deposits will be 
identical. Hence, by necessity, there will be some need to tailor the exploitation 
process (and even more so the pre-production exploration process) to local 
circumstances. The technology and the accompanying knowledge and skill inputs 
therefore are of necessity to be applied locally. This in situ application provides the 
possibility of drawing on local skills and knowledge. Indeed, skills and technological 
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knowledge have advanced even in relatively poor economies with generally weak 
backward linkages such as Tanzania (Mjimba, 2011). In other cases, such as the 
South African coal industry, the necessity to wash the poor quality mined coal led to 
the development of capabilities and products that could be used in other areas - e. g. 
washing spirals in the Canadian tar sands. In the pre-salt oil deposits off the coast of 
Brazil, new extraction and processing skills are required and this has provided 
opportunities for technological development which the Brazilian supply industry is 
beginning to exploit in targeting the offshore oil sector market in West Africa. In each 
of these cases, the knowledge is location-specific and initially provides the potential 
for local supply. Thereafter, applications of this knowledge can be used in export 
markets with similar conditions. Where there are multiple points of production in a 
single country (that is, a number of different and independently-owned mines) 
particular possibilities are opened for specialised suppliers to benefit from economies 
of scope, meeting the needs of a variety of customers. (Where exploitation involves a 
single mine, by contrast, adapting to the specific environmental conditions may be 
internalised with the mining firm  
 
Moreover, the traditional view of the soft and hard commodities sectors as being 
characterised by stable technologies is also open to question. To the contrary, in 
many commodities sectors the pace of technological change has been brisk, and/or 
is increasing. For example, in the mining sector, IT-related technologies are diffusing 
rapidly, enabling higher extraction rates and lower costs of production. In some 
cases, and this is generally not appropriate for low income economies, this is leading 
to largely automated mines (Kaplan, 2011). Other sources of technological change in 
all three families of commodities are the growing need to meet global standards 
(Kaplinsky, 2010), and the growing demand in final markets for differentiated 
products (Marin, Navas-Aleman and Perez, 2009), The consequence of this 
technological dynamic is that it offers the potential for upgrading capabilities, by 
moving into more knowledge-intensive activities.   
 
Beyond these questions of the nature and dynamism of technology in the resource 
sectors in the exploration and construction phases of the commodities sector, lie a 
range of provisions and intermediate goods which the mines require to operate on an 
ongoing basis. Often these inputs involve considerable skills. For example, Bell 
Equipment in South Africa began in the 1950s by producing machines for cutting 
timber and sugar cane. The capabilities which it built led to the development of 
horizontal linkages to other sectors, and Bell Equipment now produces large 
earthmoving equipment for the global mining sector (Kaplinsky and Mhlongo, 1997), 
selling under the John Deere brand name in the US and Hitachi brand name in 
Australia. But this example is towards the extreme end of the scale of complexity of 
inputs required by the commodities sector. Less demanding is the assembly and sub-
manufacture of the cables which link sub-sea oil wells to surface vessels and to land, 
a recently developed backward linkages in the Angolan oil industry (Teka, 2011). 
Other inputs into production are much less technology-intensive and range from the 
provision of basic utilities (water and power), the provisions required to feed the 
workforce, spares, and office supplies and spares. In the soft commodities sector, the 
range of inputs required to facilitate production include seeds, fertilisers, packaging 
materials and transport. 
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In addition to these material inputs, ongoing production requires inputs from the 
service sector, Some of these services may be technologically-demanding. But even 
here there are signs of developing backward linkages in SSA. For example, in the 
Nigerian oil sector, there is evidence of considerable local supply in the provision of 
IT services (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011). In Zambia, engineering, repair and 
maintenance services have played an important role in building industrial capabilities 
(Fessehaie, 2010). Similarly Chinese owned oil companies in the Sudan have 
encouraged substantial local supply. This has involved 17 service firms and 74 
manufacturing firms employing over 4600 workers (although all of these suppliers in 
Sudan have been Chinese-owned enterprises) (Suliman and Badawi 2010).  But 
other services, such as the provision of security staff to govern access to the site, 
transport and logistics, the maintenance of office equipment and auditing services 
have fewer technological and skill barriers to entry. 
 
Putting this range of backwardly-sourced inputs together with the active desire of 
firms to outsource activities which are not in their core competence, we can see that 
there is a large potential for backward linkages from the commodities sector. Whilst 
some operations in the commodities sector itself (particularly in hard and energy 
commodities) may be large scale and technologically complex by nature, this may 
not apply to many of the intermediate goods, provisions and services which the 
commodities sector depends on. It is therefore not surprising that despite the 
widespread belief that commodities extraction is an enclave activity, there are in 
reality many linkages which have been, and are being forged with the local 
economies in which they operate. The extent of these linkages of course depends on 
the capabilities of local firms and logistics and infrastructure costs. But, whatever the 
level of these local capacities, there will be a categories of potential inputs that can 
be supplied, and are being supplied by local firms.  
 
Importantly, the majority of these linkages occur as a natural outcome of market 
forces, and this is because a rational firm actively prefers to have reliable, low cost 
and high quality suppliers. In the first instance, the lead firms will typically search for 
the lowest cost suppliers globally, a phenomenon which is widely evidenced in the 
global value chains which feed the world with manufactures. But, once the lead-firm 
has made the decision in principle to outsource non-core activities and searched for 
the lowest cost global suppliers, the logic is wherever possible to have these 
suppliers on their doorstep, rather than located abroad, or some distance from the 
extractive activity. An efficient proximate supplier provides the capacity for flexible 
and tailored responses to the needs of the commodity extractor, allows for chain 
inventories to be reduced, and removes uncertainties associated with extended 
logistics. This unfolding process of initial outsourcing (“global sourcing”) to seek the 
lowest cost supplier which then extends in requiring the supplier to locate proximate 
to the factory (“follower supply”) was initiated in the automobile industry (Barnes and 
Kaplinsky, 2000). and has spread to many other manufacturing sectors  
 
The same logic of unfolding outsourcing, initially to the lowest cost global suppliers 
and then, wherever possible to low cost proximate suppliers is beginning to be 
observed in many of the commodities sectors, including Chinese copper mining firms 
in Zambia, who are bringing their (Chinese) suppliers with them (Fessehaie, 2011). 
This desirability of finding an efficient local supplier is particularly attractive in Africa 
where transport and logistics are poorly developed and goods brought in from 
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outside may be subject to long and unpredictable delays. Both of these phenomena – 
a drive towards outsourcing and the promotion of local suppliers - is in fundamental 
contradiction to the enclave strategy which foreign-owned mining and energy firms 
are generally accused of adopting. Although the degree of these market-driven 
linkages is contextual (varying between sectors and countries, and within sectors 
across different countries and within countries across different sectors), as a general 
rule they are a function of two major factors. The first is time. Particularly in 
commodities sectors governed by very large technological barriers to entry, it will 
take some time for these linkages to be developed. Bell, for example, found that even 
in the most dynamic Asian economies, the development of industrial competences in 
many sectors often took three decades or longer. (Bell, 2006).  
 
And, second, the depth and breadth of linkages will also reflect local industrial and 
service-sector capabilities. In Zambia, copper mining companies were not satisfied 
with the performance of the local supply chain, though they all pointed to the 
existence of a small number of very capable suppliers (mostly original equipment 
manufacture, and some engineering firms). Suppliers were seem to have 
underperformed in all the critical success factors (CSFs) which were deemed 
important by the purchasing managers of these mines, particularly in relation to trust, 
innovation and technological capabilities, and lead times (Figure 10). Suppliers 
consistently overestimated their performance in all the CSFs. Because of this critical 
value chain misalignment, suppliers failed to understand the areas where improved 
capabilities were required and the reason underlying the buyers‟ decision to import 
(Fessehaie, 2010). 
 
Figure 10: Buyers perception of supplier capabilities in the Zambian copper 
industry (2010) 
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Source: Fessehaie (2010) 
 
In contrast, the gold mining industry in Ghana provides an example of the 
development of linkages over time (Table 3). Although the bulk of inputs were 
imported, there is a discernable local spend, arising as a natural consequence of the 
development of the local gold mining industry over a period of 130 years. 
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Table 3: Value and composition of expenditure in Ghanaian gold industry, 2008 
(US$m and share of total purchases) 
 $m Share of total 
purchases 
Wages and salaries 175 8 
Capital expenditure 669 29 
Fiscal contribution 148 6 
Disbursements to communities 12 1 
Local purchases (excl fuel and power) 567 20 
Fuel and power 428 18 
Loans 52 2 
Imported consumables 376 18 
Total 2,427 100 
Source: Bloch and Owusu, 2011 
 
What factors determine the breadth and depth of linkages from the 
commodities sectors? 
 
Working with these examples of backward and forward linkages we can build a 
general story of the factors which determine the breadth and depth of linkages from 
the commodities sector in the contemporary period. This is shown in Figure 11. The 
vertical axis measures the composition of value added in the provision of inputs into 
the production of a commodity. Here we can distinguish on the one hand – based on 
the insights provided from the core competences and global value chain theoretical 
frameworks – a series of inputs which the lead commodity producers have no 
intrinsic interest in maintaining in-house since they do not reflect their core 
competences. That is, the firms have no distinct competences in the production of 
these inputs, and/or the barriers to entry may be low. We characterise these as win-
win linkages, that is, where lead commodity producing firms and local suppliers and 
customers have a common interest in developing local linkages. On the other hand, 
there are a range of inputs which are central to the firm‟s competitiveness and which 
it is reluctant to see undertaken by a competitor. We consider these to be win-lose 
linkages. For example, in the case of diamonds the cutting and polishing firms may 
actively want auditing, office provisions and utilities to be provided by outsiders, and 
in the best of all cases, by reliable and low-cost suppliers based as close to their 
operations as possible. On the other hand, they are very reluctant, and have to be 
forced, to allow suppliers to participate in the cutting and polishing, and in the 
logistics which guarantee their control over diamond supplies, for these are their core 
competences, and the factors which determine their profitability over time (Mbayi, 
2011). 
 
The horizontal axis of Figure 11 reflects the passage of time. The curve shows that, 
as a general consequence of the building of local competences over time and the 
active search by lead commodity producers to outsource the production of inputs 
which are not within their core competences, there is a market-driven process in 
which an increasing proportion of inputs are initially sourced outside of the lead firm, 
and subsequently to suppliers in the local economy. The rate of change is low when 
countries have weakly developed industrial competences, where commodity 
extraction is a relatively recent phenomenon and where relatively few inputs are 
required. We can situate the Zambian copper industry (relatively few linkages), the 
Ghanaian gold industry (moderate linkages with the development of mining supply 
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industrial districts), and the South African mining industry in general on this graph. 
These are countries where market forces have been the dominant driver of linkages 
from the commodities sector to other sectors in the domestic economy. In the case of 
South Africa, some of the domestic firms are global industry leaders, so that even 
through they do not outsource core competences, they are provided domestically. (In 
other words, these do not constitute local linkages, but do contribute, through 
internalisation, to local value added). In each of these cases we are observing 
backward linkages. But market driven forward linkages are also to be found, 
particularly in the processing of food commodities and other soft commodities. 
 
Figure 11: Market driven linkages over time* 
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* The Zambian copper industry is discussed in Fessehaie, 2011; the Ghanaian gold industry 
in Bloch and Owusu, 2011, and the South African mining industry in Kaplan, 2011 
 
Figure 11 above describes a process of the largely market driven development of 
linkages, determined as we have seen by the desire of lead commodity firms to 
outsource non core activities. But governments often intervene in this process of 
linkage building in order to maximise the extent to which these outsourced activities 
occur domestically. Government involvement may be effective such that it acts to 
both deepen and speed up these linkages (the curve shifts up, and to the left), or 
where policy is badly-focused and implemented, to slow down and make the linkages 
shallower (the curve moves to the right and down) (Figure 12). Botswana in 
diamonds (Mbayi, 2011), Angola (Teka, 2011) and Nigeria in oil (Oyejide and 
Adewuyi, 2011), and Gabon in timber (Terheggen, 2011) are all examples of 
countries where government involvement has speeded up these linkages. In 
Tanzania, the failure of diverse government policies to work in the same direction has 
if anything, slowed down the pace of linkage development (Mjimba, 2011). In recent 
years, policies in South Africa designed to enforce black ownership have led to the 
migration of some firms (and skilled workers) abroad, thus undermining the capacity 
of local suppliers to meet the needs of the mines (Kaplan, 2011).  
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Figure 12: Market driven linkages over time: The impact of policy 
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The trajectory of the deepening of local content will change over time as a 
consequence of five major inter-related factors. The first is the bundle of critical 
success factors required by the buyers. This will involve a range of requirements, 
including price, quality and reliability of delivery, and these critical success factors will 
vary with the nature of the inputs. The second is time – the market-led incorporation 
of inputs is a natural function of time as lead commodity firms and potential suppliers 
assess competitive costing profiles and develop the capabilities to supply and to buy 
effectively. The third factor affecting deepening is scale – the larger the commodity 
extracting activity, the more likely that suppliers will be able to generate the scale 
economies to achieve competitive production. The fourth factor is the complexity of 
the input – the greater the degree of complexity, the less likely in most environments 
that suppliers will be able to respond in the short- to medium-term. And finally, the 
capacity of local suppliers to respond to the needs of buyers competitively will 
depend on their dynamic capabilities. “Global competitiveness” is a moving frontier, 
and the challenge for domestic suppliers is at the very least to keep up with this rate 
of improvement and ideally to increase the rate of their competitive improvement.  
 
Given these five factors, it is possible to identify three sets of possible inputs (Figure 
13). The first are the “low hanging fruit”, supplies which are either available locally at 
lower acquisition costs than imported supplies, or at costs which are close to the cost 
of imported supplies. The second set comprises suppliers who have the embryonic 
capacity to be competitive, but who need time and support in order to grow their 
capabilities if they are to approach the global frontier. And, finally, there are the 
sectors beyond early reach. It will be some time, if ever, before local suppliers can 
provide competitive inputs in these activities. These three categories of supplier 
competitiveness are intrinsically contextual. Which supplies are included in which 
group will reflect sectoral characteristics (for example, easier in agriculture than in 
deep-sea oil), country capabilities (linkages will be deeper and broader in South 
Africa than in Tanzania), technological change (the frontier of global competitiveness 
will shift to varying degrees), time (capabilities take some time to develop) and as we 
shall argue in later stages of this Discussion Paper, policy. 
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Figure 13. The trajectory of local supply 
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An important caveat to this model of the development of linkages over time, 
particularly when government has intervened to speed up and deepen linkage-
development, is that the outcomes may not be “economically optimal”. That is, 
policies designed to increase local content in backward linkages or to promote 
forward linkages may be very costly, with inefficiencies in these linkage provision 
consuming some of the resource rents generated in the commodities sector. 
Similarly, where government policies hold back the development of linkages which 
would have occurred as a natural consequence of market forces (for example, as in 
the case of gold in Tanzania. Mjimba, 2011), there may also be opportunity costs 
associated with not encouraging the development of linkages. In this case, it is the 
foregone benefits which are lost where faster and deeper linkage development would 
have provided local incomes, supported the development of local capabilities and 
saved foreign exchange expenditures. It is difficult to argue the case a priori whether 
short-run inefficiencies are an optimal way of developing efficient long-run 
capabilities, since this will vary across sectors and countries and over time. It is 
however a prime consideration, as we shall see in a later Discussion Paper, in the 
policies adopted towards increasing the breadth and depth of linkages in the 
commodities sectors. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS: WHY SHOULD GOVERNMENTS 
INTERVENE IN LINKAGE DEVELOPMENT? 
 
In this section of the Discussion Paper we briefly set out the implications of our 
analysis for policy. These issues will be covered in greater depth in a complementary 
Discussion Paper directed primarily at the policy framework required to make the 
most of the potential for linkages between industry and the commodities sector 
(MMCP Discussion Paper No 14). 
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Governments are interested in the promotion of linkages from the commodities 
sectors for five major reasons. In the first instance, most governments prioritise the 
promotion of growth and employment. In general, in the hard and energy 
commodities sectors which are characterised by capital-intensive processing 
technologies, the employment potential arising from forward linkages is limited. This 
does not apply though as a general rule in soft commodities, where forward linkages 
involving the processing of commodities are often labour intensive. By contrast, 
backward linkages into all three families of commodities are generally relatively 
labour intensive in nature, particularly at early stages of the development of local 
supply, and are thus an attractive source of diversification for governments. These 
linkages – forward and backward – may also increase GDP, although where the 
profitability of suppliers and users is wholly dependent on extensive government 
intervention and support, this increase may be nominal rather than real. 
 
A second reason for governments acting to foster linkages into the commodities 
sector is that, as Hirschman pointed out, this provides a major opportunity for the 
diversification of the economy. Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in producing 
inputs efficiently for the commodities sector, or in using the sector‟s outputs 
effectively, the development of linkages provides some form of signposting for the 
development of the industrial and service sectors. But following a linkage thread from 
the commodities sector does not necessarily translate into the development of an 
efficient and competitive diversified economy.  
 
Third, and related to the signposting involved in diversification from commodities, is 
the capacity which may be provided to develop dynamic capabilities over time. That 
is, whilst governments may know that in the short-term there is little prospect of 
developing efficient linkages activities, they may have good reasons to believe that 
this is a problem which may be solved, or at least be diminished over time. They may 
actively target these linkages as a fulcrum for their industrial policy in the belief that 
complementary development of the national systems of innovation may result in a 
competitive diversified economy in the future. This is a policy agenda which 
Botswana has explicitly adopted in the promotion of forward linkages from its 
diamond-mining sector (Mbayi, 2011). 
 
Fourth, linkages from the commodities sector may lead to the generation of external 
economies, including via horizontal linkages (Figure 9 above). We have already 
given the examples of South Africa‟s hydraulic engineering industry. But these are 
examples drawn from the more knowledge-intensive side of the linkage spectrum. In 
Angola, which is characterised by a particularly weak metallurgical sector, the 
stimulation of a basic metal-working capability required in the manufacture and 
assembly of control lines between the subsea and the surface is helping to create a 
demand for metal-working capabilities which will have wide-ranging implications for 
other manufacturing sectors and for the construction and infrastructure sectors 
(Teka, 2011). In Nigeria, IT skills created in serving the needs of the oil sector, are 
also being applied to other sectors (Oyejide and Adewuyi, 2011). Another important 
avenue for external economies are the intra- and inter-sectoral linkages arising from 
the development of infrastructure to meet the needs of the commodities sector. For 
example, the improvement of the Central Corridor, linking the Tanzanian coast with 
its interior, and then Rwanda and the DRC, is an example of how linkages developed 
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in a mining sector may spill over into economic opportunities for agriculture and for 
mining in other sectors and other countries (Perkins and Robbins, 2011).  
 
Fifth, government intervention to foster the development of linkages also follows from 
the failure of lead commodity producers to strategise effectively and then to 
implement the development of their supply base. They often fail to “walk the talk”. 
Our research (MMCP Discussion Paper No 13) shows that there are insufficient 
examples of MNCs effectively mentoring and guiding potential local suppliers, even 
though most claim that this is a central concern for them. Why does this happen 
when the development of local suppliers holds such competitive advantages for 
these lead commodity producers and where many of the mining houses have 
formally committed themselves to encouraging and supporting local development? In 
part, the explanation lies in the sociology of the firm, and the routines which it 
generates (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Even in manufacturing - where supply chain 
management is most developed – outside of large Japanese firms and a few of their 
US and European competitors, supply chain development is generally a commitment 
rather than a reality. In other sectors and other countries Governments have acted to 
shake up the inertia of leading firms. (This occurred in the UK in the 1980s and 
1990s in the automobile sector). The commodities sector is a latecomer in its 
commitment to supply chain development, which compounds these problems of non-
implementation.  
 
A further reason why lead firms in the commodities sector fail to develop effective 
supply chain development strategies for local suppliers arises from the nature of the 
contracts which are struck when investments are committed to build new mines and 
oil wells. The general rule is for the mining firm/or the oilfield operator to sub-contract 
mine-building or well-construction to a specialised construction and installation firms. 
These contractors operate at a global level and have long-established links with their 
own sub-contractors. More importantly, the firms involved in construction do not run 
the mine. Hence standards are set for the mine/oil builder which may be poorly 
geared for using local suppliers on an ongoing basis. For example, in Tanzania, the 
firm responsible for building one of the new gold mines, was based in Australia. The 
specifications it used for plastic-piping and electric fittings met Australian standards, 
rather than Tanzanian standards, thereby effectively ruling out local second- 
contractors in the mine-building process (Hanlin, 2011). A third reason why lead 
commodity producers do not make optimal use of local suppliers is one which arises 
particularly when the mine or well is located in foreign, isolated and often harsh 
conditions (Hanlin, 2011; Mjimba, 2011). The consequence is that supply chain 
management staff and the purchasing function characteristically work on short and 
intensive work cycles, typically six weeks on, and six weeks off. Coupled with their 
failure to speak the local language, their short residency does not provide them with 
the opportunity to build the long-term personal relations with local suppliers which are 
often critical to an extension of local sourcing and to the successful implementation of 
supply chain development programmes. 
 
in conclusion, the growing obstacles to traditional drivers of industrialisation – import 
substituting and export-oriented industrialisation – make it imperative that all 
economies, including commodity-exporting economies, develop effective strategies 
to promote their industrial sectors. As we have seen, there is a renewed opportunity 
open to commodity exporting low income economies which arises from a continuing, 
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and probably prolonged commodity boom, and the development of corporate 
strategies designed to maximise the outsourcing of non-core activities. Handled 
effectively, this provides the potential to foster economic diversification by building on 
forward and (especially) backward linkages. But it is a strategic path which is littered 
with the corpses of failed attempts, undermined by a combination of weak and 
inappropriate policy support and grandiose and unrealistic expectations about the 
capacity of the economy to develop dynamic comparative advantages. 
 
Thus, policy responses need to be evidence-based and strategic, aligned to 
corporate visions and implementation plans, and to be complemented by policy 
instruments which provide appropriate incentives and sanctions. Moreover – and 
here it is important to learn a lesson from China‟s recent development experience – 
one-size-does-not-fit-all, and policy needs to be pragmatic and flexible. Context is 
important, since not just are there major differences between the three families of 
soft, hard and energy commodities, but there are also important intra-family 
differences. Moreover, each economy is individual, and experiences a moving 
frontier of capabilities and political-economic characteristics. It is also clear from 
international evidence that effective policy is a process rather than a document, and 
that it necessarily involves close interaction between public and private stakeholders 
(Rodrik, 2004), and in some cases also civil society stakeholders.  
 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the development of 
outsourcing strategies by lead firms in global value chains is that the enclave 
mentality to diversification in low economies is an anachronism. There is extensive 
scope for governments and the private sector – both firms directly involved in the 
commodities sector and those with the potential to develop linkages in the 
commodities sector - to work together to identify the range of win-win outcomes 
available in promoting diversification. The consequence of the legacy of mistrust in 
many countries, the blinkered visions of firms (a form of pervasive market failure) and 
historically inappropriate and ineffective policies may have dampened linkages in the 
past. But by the same token they are suggestive of substantial opportunity in the 
future. 
 
In a companion Discussion Paper 13 we present the evidence of detailed enquiry into 
the nature and determinants of linkages form the commodities sectors in nine African 
Countries (Morris et al 2011a). In a third and concluding Discussion Paper 14 we 
address the detailed policy recommendations which follow from our analysis (Morris 
et al 2011b). 
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